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Abstract
We study the trading dynamics in an asset market where the quality of assets is private
information of the owner and nding a counterparty takes time. When trading of a
nancial asset ceases in equilibrium as a response to an adverse shock to asset qual-
ity, a large player can resurrect the market by purchasing bad assets which involves
nancial losses. The equilibrium response to such a policy is intricate as it creates an
announcement eect: a mere announcement of intervening at a later point in time can
cause markets to function again. This eect leads to a gradual recovery in trading
volume, with asset prices converging non-monotonically to their normal values. The
optimal policy is to intervene immediately at a minimal scale when markets are deemed
important and losses are small. As losses increase and the importance of the market
declines, the optimal intervention is delayed and it can be desirable to rely more on
the announcement eect by increasing the size of the intervention. Search frictions are
important for all these results. They compound adverse selection, making a market
more fragile with respect to a classic lemons problem. They dampen the announce-
ment eect and cause the optimal policy to be more aggressive, leading to an earlier
intervention at a larger scale.
Keywords: Trading Dynamics, Adverse Selection, Search, Intervention in Asset Markets,
Announcement Eect
JEL Classication: G1, E6
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11 Introduction
During the nancial crisis of 2007 to 2009, there was a stunning dierence in how asset
markets were aected according to their infrastructure. Markets with centralized trading
functioned rather well. To the contrary, in over-the-counter markets { where trading takes
place on a decentralized and ad-hoc basis and where assets are less standardized and arguably
more opaque { trading came to a halt. Most prominently, collateralized debt obligations,
asset backed securities and commercial paper were traded only sporadically or not at all
(see Gorton and Metrick, 2010). This prompted massive government intervention in the
from of short-term liquidity provision and long-term asset purchases which led to a (partial)
resurrection of trading in these markets over time.
Markets for structured debt nancing experienced a sudden, unexpected deterioration of
the average quality of assets1 and some observers have pointed to adverse selection as the
source for these markets not functioning properly. However, the question arises whether the
peculiar features of over-the-counter trading { private information about the quality of assets
and search for a counterparty { made those markets more prone to a market freeze.2 If so,
are these features important to understand the role and design of a government intervention
in these markets? In this paper, we nd that search frictions in asset markets compound
adverse selection, making the market more fragile to unexpected shocks to the quality of
assets. These trading frictions also determine the response of the market to a government
intervention and thus inuence the optimal design of a policy aimed at resurrecting trading
in those markets.
To derive these insights, it is natural to combine two existing strands of literature on market
microstructure which have emphasized private information and trading frictions separately.
Starting with Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1989), models of traders that are
privately informed about the asset quality have been used widely to shed light on pricing
and transaction costs in nancial markets. More recently, a new approach to study price
and trading dynamics has spawned from the work by Due, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005)
that uses random search to model over-the-counter trading, but does not take into account
that assets might be opaque.3
1Moody's Investor Service (2010) reports large spikes in impairment probabilities for structured debt
products across all ratings and products for 2007 to 2009).
2When assets are opaque, private information can arise when owners of assets have an advantage or a
higher incentive to acquire information about the quality of assets relative to potential buyers (see Dang,
Gorton and Holmstr om, 2009).
3Another related literature uses random matching models with private information to study monetary
2Our paper shows that shocks to asset quality lead to a market freeze due to a lemons problem
 a la Akerlof (1970) when traders have to search for a counterparty. Trading, however, can
be restored, if the government reduces the adverse selection problem (Mankiw, 1986). We
capture this idea by introducing a large player that acts as a one-time, non-competitive
market-maker buying a sucient amount of lemons permanently in response to the market
breakdown. This distinguishes our paper from the work on for-prot dealers in over-the-
counter markets. In this literature, market-makers alleviate temporary, market-wide liquidity
shocks by holding inventories (see for example Weill, 2007; Lagos and Rocheteau, 2009; Lagos,
Rocheteau and Weill, 2011), whereas in our work, liquidity in the market is endogenous
and collapses in response to adverse selection. The intervention has then to remove assets
permanently to reduce the lemons problem which always causes losses and thus requires
deep pockets { hence, the interpretation of the large player as the government. Similarly, in
the market-making literature government intervention in the form of asset purchases can be
rationalized whenever the expectation of negative prots prevents private market-making in
response to a liquidity shock.
Since our set-up is dynamic, we can study the equilibrium dynamics from a market freeze
to a recovery created by a public intervention.4 The intervention is characterized by the
amount of lemons bought, the price paid and its timing. The time dimension is the most
interesting one as it causes an announcement eect: merely announcing to intervene at a
later point in time can cause the market to recover prior to the actual intervention. The
optimal intervention trades o the costs of the intervention with the gains from a market
recovery. If the market is important, it is best to ensure that it continuously functions with
an immediate intervention. As the importance of the market declines, it becomes optimal to
delay and to increases the size of the intervention. The announcement eect then causes a
gradual recovery in trading volume before the intervention, with market prices reacting non-
monotonically, rst decreasing before the intervention and then recovering to their long-term
value.
In our stylized set-up, traders randomly meet to trade an asset. There are two types of assets,
good assets that pay a dividend and lemons which for simplicity never pay any dividend.
exchange (for example Williamson and Wright, 1994; Lester, Postlewaite and Wright, 2008; Li and Rocheteau,
2011, among others).
4In independent work, Tirole (2011) uses a static framework that analyzes a similar government policy.
Hence, it can neither address the optimal timing of the intervention nor the interaction of this decision with
the quantity and price of the intervention. Recently, Guerreri and Shimer (2011) have extended this idea to
dynamic asset markets where trading is competitive. They do not, however, analyze the design of the policy
in detail.
3What makes trading dicult is adverse selection: only the current owner of the asset can
observe its quality, while the potential buyer only learns the quality after he has bought the
asset. To create an incentive to trade assets, we assume that traders are hit randomly with
a valuation shock. Upon buying a good asset, the buyer starts out with a high valuation,
but over time he will switch to a low valuation and want to resell the asset. In equilibrium,
while lemons are always up for sale, good assets will only be sold if their owners suer a low
valuation shock. Allowing buyers to make a take-it-or-leave-it oer results in the optimal
oer being a pooling contract.5
The dynamics of trading are non-trivial and driven by search frictions. To understand them,
we can look at the evolution of buyers' trade surplus over time which depends on two distinct
eects, one that is backward-looking and another one that is forward-looking. First, a buyer's
expected trade surplus depends on an endogenous stochastic process that governs how many
good assets are for sale { or the average quality of assets { in the market. It is driven by the
inow of sellers that have received a low valuation shock. But it also depends on the speed
at which transactions take place in the market which is governed by how often traders meet
and the willingness of buyers to make an oer. We call this eect quality eect, since past
trading behavior is summarized in the current quality of assets for sale. Second, a buyer's
expected trade surplus also depends on how easy it is to resell the asset in the future. This
matters for two reasons. Having a good asset, there is value in selling it again when the
owner receives a valuation shock. But more importantly, if a buyer obtains a lemon in a
trade, he would like to sell it as quickly as possible, since it does not yield a dividend. We
call this eect strategic complementarity.6
These two eects determine how search frictions inuence the fragility of the asset market
and its trading dynamics in response to an intervention. First, due to the strategic comple-
mentarity, equilibria with and without trade can co-exist. When search frictions are high,
buyers are reluctant to take on a position since they expect that it will be dicult to nd
a counterparty to undo it in future. As a result, it becomes harder to sustain trading in
5This distinguishes us from Guerreri, Shimer and Wright (2010) that use competitive search to obtain a
separating equilibrium in asset markets with adverse selection. Chang (2011) builds on this work to show
that liquidity in the form of endogenous market tightness is disturbed downwards in equilibrium when there
is a lemons problem for trading assets. Other papers with dynamic adverse selection also arrive at a pooling
equilibrium, but by requiring that transactions have to take place at a single price (see for example Eisfeldt,
2004; Kurlat, 2010).
6Garleanu (2009) points out that this complementarity can be important for understanding trade size
and portfolio choice in asset markets. For simplicity, we abstract from such considerations which could
strengthen this eect.
4equilibrium for a given quality of assets. Also, smaller shocks to quality can lead to a market
freeze. Conditional on having a market freeze, search frictions also determine the impact
of an intervention on trading through the announcement eect. A market with high search
frictions recovers later because the quality eect kicks in slower and the diculty of nding a
counterparty reduces the absolute magnitude of the strategic complementarity.7 This implies
that the design of the optimal policy has to take into account the fact that market recovery
is slower when search frictions are large. To resurrect such a market, the large player has to
intervene more aggressively by purchasing assets at an earlier time and a higher price.
There are many papers emerging that either dwell on the role of asymmetric information or
on a strategic complementarity (and, hence, multiple equilibria) to generate a market freeze
in the context of nancial markets. Our paper is unique as it combines both elements and
analyzes the trading dynamics in response to a policy that chooses the optimal timing and
scale of an intervention designed to resurrect the market.8 However, we do not investigate
how information is revealed through trading in the market place. Lester and Camargo (2010)
is an interesting contribution, since it studies, when there is asymmetric information, how
quickly a market can sort out assets with dierent qualities and clears in the absence of
an intervention. In our paper, the lemons problem does not diminish over time, making an
intervention necessary for a recovery. In the tradition of sequential bargaining as a foundation
of trading frictions in asset markets, Zhu (2010) generates endogenously adverse selection
in a sequential search model when sellers visit multiple buyers and infer the quality of the
assets from the frequency of their meetings. Finally, Due, Malamud and Manso (2009)
investigate the incentives to search for information which could be applied to a situation of
trading assets when there is asymmetric information.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. In Section 3, we analyze
how an unanticipated, permanent negative shock to the asset quality can lead to a market
freeze. Section 4 studies how an intervention can resurrect the market and characterizes the
price and trading dynamics. Section 5 analyzes the optimal design of intervention. Section
6 calibrates the model and performs various numerical analyses. We conclude with a brief
discussion.
7In a relative sense, an intervention is more eective with high search frictions, as it brings the market
closer to its normal time activity after an initially delayed response.
8Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011) is an exception in that the timing of the intervention matters.
An early intervention can prevent a market freeze, but it can also preclude the supply of private liquidity in
the secondary market for assets.
52 The Environment
We employ a basic model of asset pricing under search frictions and introduce adverse se-
lection. Time is continuous. There is a measure of 1 + S traders that trade S assets. These
assets are of two types. A fraction  of the assets yields a dividend  (good assets), whereas
the rest does not yield a dividend (lemons). The return on these assets is private information
for the owner of the asset; i.e., only the trader who owns the asset can observe its return,
but not other traders.
Traders are risk-neutral and discount time at a rate r. We assume that each investor can
either hold one unit of an asset or no asset.9 A trader who owns a good asset is subject to
a random preference shock that can reduce his valuation from  to    x > 0. Conditional
on holding a good asset, the preference shock arrives according to a Poisson process with
rate  2 I R+. Once a trader experiences this shock, his valuation of the asset will remain
low until the asset is sold. This captures the idea that some traders who own an asset might
have a need for selling it { or in other words, have a need for liquidity. The higher , the
more likely an investor will face such needs. Traders therefore go through a dierent trading
status depending on their asset holdings and their valuation of the asset. There are four
dierent stages that occur sequentially: (i) buyers (b) do not own an asset; (ii) owners (o)
have a good asset and a high valuation; (iii) traders (`) who own a lemon; and (iv) sellers (s)
who have a good assets, but have experienced a transition to low valuation. We denote the
measure of traders of dierent types at time t as b(t), o(t), `(t) and s(t) respectively.
There is no centralized market mechanism to trade assets. Instead, traders with an asset
and buyers are matched according to a technology given by a matching function M(t) =
b(t)[o(t)+s(t)+`(t)], where M(t) is the total number of matches, and  is a parameter
capturing the matching rate.10 We assume throughout that in pairwise meetings the buyer
makes a take-it-or-leave it oer to the seller to buy one unit of the asset at price p(t)11 and
that traders cannot dispose of an asset to become a buyer again.12
9This is a restriction on total asset holdings. While assets are indivisible, traders can still use lotteries
and employ mixed strategies to trade assets.
10The interpretation is that traders are matched according to a Poisson process with a xed arrival rate.
As a result, matches with traders seeking the opposite side of a trade occur at a rate  which is proportional
to the measure of traders in that group.
11This is a simplifying assumption merely to avoid the issue of formulating a bargaining procedure in the
presence of imperfect information.
12By restricting the number of assets relative to measure of traders in the economy, we can easily dispense

































Figure 1: Flow Diagram
We can then describe the economy by a ow diagram as shown in Figure 1. A buyer becomes
an owner by buying a good asset (with probability s) or a lemon by buying a bad asset
(with probability `). He turns from an owner into a seller when receiving a negative
preference shock (with probability ). Finally, if there is trade, good sellers and lemons
sell their assets and become buyers (with probability b). If not, they remain in their
respective states. A classic adverse selection problem arises here, because lemons will choose
in equilibrium to transit immediately from buying to selling the asset, while owners have
rst to experience a preference shock.
3 Market Freeze
3.1 Pooling Equilibria
We rst solve for steady state equilibria where buyers oer to purchase an asset at a price
that pools sellers of good assets and lemons.13 To allow for mixed strategy equilibria, a
13We show in Appendix C that a pooling contract dominates any other contract including a separating
one with lotteries.
7buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer with probability (t) if in a meeting with another
trader at time t. When making his oer, a buyer needs to take into account whether their
price induces sellers with good assets to accept the oer. Denoting the rst random time a





 r(s t)(   x)ds + e
 r( t) maxfp() + vb(t);vs()g

. (1)
The rst expression on the right-hand side is the ow value from owning the security. The
second term gives the discounted value of meeting a buyer at random time  > t and receiving
an oer. In such a meeting, the seller either accepts the oer or rejects it. If he rejects, he
stays a seller (vs()). When accepting the oer, the seller will receive the price p(t) and
become a buyer with value vb(t). Dierentiating this expression with respect to time t and
rearranging yields the following dierential equation
rvs(t) = (   x) + (t)b(t)maxfp(t) + vb(t)   vs(t);0g + _ vs(t). (2)
We can derive similar value functions for the other types of traders denoted by vo(t) for
owners, v`(t) for lemons and vb(t) for buyers. Notice that there is no gains from trading
between owners and buyers, as they have the same valuation of a good asset. We thus have
rvo(t) =  + (vs(t)   vo(t)) + _ vo(t) (3)
rv`(t) = (t)b(t)maxfp(t) + vb(t)   v`(t);0g + _ v`(t) (4)
rvb(t) = (t)(s(t) + `(t))maxfmax
p(t)
~ (p)vo + (1   ~ (p))v`(t)   p(t)   vb(t);0g + _ vb(t).(5)
An owner enjoys the full value of the dividend ow until he receives a liquidity shock and
turns into a seller which occurs with probability . Sellers of lemons { which we will simply
call lemons from now on { are always on the market as they hold asset which do not yield a
dividend. Upon selling the asset at price p, they become buyers again. The value function
of a buyer takes into account that he can choose not to buy the asset in a meeting. If he
makes an oer, the buyer will choose a price that maximizes his expected pay-o given the
composition of traders that are willing to sell. This is reected in the probability of obtaining
a good asset which is a function of the price he oers (~ (p)).
Upon acquiring a lemon, a buyer will immediately try to sell it again since it oers no
dividend ow. To the contrary, when acquiring a good asset, he has the highest valuation
of the asset and will sell it only after receiving a preference shock that lowers his valuation
which occurs with frequency . This implies that the measure of dierent types of traders
8evolves according to the following ow equations
_ b(t) =  (t)(s(t) + `(t)) + (t)(s(t) + `(t)) = 0 (6)
_ o(t) =  o(t) + (t)s(t) (7)
_ s(t) = o(t)   (t)s(t) (8)
_ `(t) =  (t)`(t) + (t)`(t) = 0. (9)
Due to the trading structure, the number of buyers stays constant and is normalized to
b(t) = 1. Similarly, all lemons are constantly for sale and, hence, `(t) = (1   )S.
For a buyer to induce a seller to accept his take-it-or-leave-it oer, he needs to oer a
price that compensates the seller for switching to become a buyer, or p(t)  vs(t)   vb(t).
Since lemons do not derive any ow utility from their asset, we have that vs(t)  v`(t)
and, consequently, they will accept the buyer's oer whenever sellers do. For the buyer, the






s(t)+`(t) if p(t)  vs(t)   vb(t)
0 if p(t) < vs(t)   vb(t).
(10)
This formulates the basic adverse selection problem. While lemons are always for sale, good
assets go on sale only if their current owner experiences a preference shock. As a consequence,
there are fewer good assets for sale than in the population. Also, if the buyer oers a price
that is too low, good sellers will reject the oer and he will acquire a lemon for sure. Any
oer by the buyer will thus be given by p(t) = vs(t)   vb(t). For the further analysis, it is
convenient to dene the buyer's expected surplus from buying the asset
 (t) = ~ (p)vo + (1   ~ (p))v`(t)   vs(t), (11)
where we have take into account that any oer will set p(t) = vs(t)   vb(t). This yields the
following denition of equilibrium.
Denition 1. An equilibrium is given by measurable functions (t) and ~ (t) such that
1. for all t, the strategy (t) is optimal taking as given () for all  > t; i.e.,
(t) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if  (t) < 0
2 [0;1] if  (t) = 0
1 if  (t) > 0.
(12)
2. The function ~ (t) is generated by (t) and the law of motion for s(t).
93.2 Steady State Equilibria
In steady state, the measure of traders of dierent types are given by
o + s = S (13)
o = s. (14)















+(1 ) if p  vs   vb
0 if p < vs   vb.
(17)













Only the value of lemons depends on the trading strategy  of buyers. Due to the pooling
equilibrium, they can still extract some surplus from buyers despite the take-it-or-leave-
it-oer; in other words, if  > 0, v` > 0 reects an informational rent for lemons. To
characterize steady state equilibria, we only need to consider the optimal strategy of buyers.
Buyers trade if and only if they have a positive expected surplus from trading
 (t) = ~ vo + (1   ~ )v`   vs  0. (21)











 r + . (22)
This allows us to determine two thresholds for the asset quality, below which a no trade
equilibrium exists () and above which a trade equilibrium exists ( ). First, set  = 1 and
dene =(   x) = . Then, using the expression for ~  in order to get trade we need that
 
( + )(r + )
(r + ) + ( + r)
  . (23)





Comparing the two thresholds, we obtain that     if and only if   r. Finally, for any
given  in between these thresholds, the indierence condition requires
 =
( + )(r + )
(r + ) + ( + r)
(25)
Dierentiating we get (up to a constant)
@
@
= (   1)(r + )(r   ), (26)
which depends on r relative to . In particular,  increases with  if and only if r > . This
gives the following result.
Proposition 2. For any given  2 (0;1), a steady state equilibrium exists.
If    , we have that  = 1 is a steady state equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e. all buyers
trade.
If   , we have that  = 0 is a steady state equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e. buyers do
not trade.
If  < r, the steady state equilibrium is unique, with the equilibrium for  2 (;  ) being in
mixed strategies.
If  > r, for  2 ( ;), there are three steady state equilibria including a mixed strategy one.
Figure 2 depicts steady state equilibria. When the average quality of the assets  is too low,
there cannot be any trading in equilibrium { a situation which we call market freeze. This
is associated with welfare losses as good assets cannot be allocated between traders that
have dierent valuations for the asset. Similarly, for high average quality , trade ( = 1) is
the unique equilibrium. For intermediate values of , there can be multiple equilibria with
partial trade ( 2 (0;1)).
3.3 The Role of Search Frictions
Search frictions as captured by the parameter  of the matching function play a key role in
























(i) κ > r (ii) r > κ
Figure 2: Steady State Equilibria
. This can be best understood by slightly rewriting the expected surplus of buyers to obtain
 
(1   ~ )vs
=
~ 


























The rst term captures a quality eect and describes how the average quality of assets for
sale aects the trade surplus. If the trading volume as proxied by  is large, there are
relatively few good assets for sale at any point in time. This lowers the expected quality of
the asset purchased by a buyer and, hence, his expected surplus.
The second term is independent of the average quality and captures a (dynamic) strategic
complementarity. When a buyer decides to purchase an asset, it matters how easy it is to
turn around a lemon in the future. If future buyers are less willing to trade, the asset market
becomes less liquid giving the current buyer a lower incentive to trade. Conversely, if future
buyers are more willing to purchase assets, it becomes easier for a buyer to turn around a
lemon in the market increasing v`. These two eects work in opposite directions and can
cause trading even to decline when the quality of the asset increases as shown in Figure 2.
In general, as search frictions become larger { i.e.,  decreases { the dierence between a
trade ( = 1) and a no-trade equilibrium ( = 0) vanishes as shown in Figure 3. Equation












For  ! 0, the strategic complementarity and thus the multiplicity of equilibrium disappears.








π (i) κ > r (ii) r > κ








Figure 3: Role of Search Frictions
in the market: there are many good assets for sale at any point in time. However, when
purchasing a lemon it is hard to sell it again. In this sense,  measures the maximum quality
eect.
When trading becomes frictionless ( ! 1), we have that the strategic complementarity
becomes large, but at the same time, the quality eect completely disappears. This is due
to the fact that the number of good assets for sale relative to bad assets converges to 0. In











which denes an asymptote for  , which is the minimum value of  satisfying this inequality.
When  > r, the complementarity dominates and it becomes easier to support trading in
equilibrium { at the expense of multiple equilibria. It is in this sense that search frictions
compound the adverse selection problem. As a consequence, markets with frictional trading
are more fragile when the quality of assets  declines as we show next.
3.4 Unanticipated Quality Shocks
We now consider a market freeze induced by an unexpected, permanent shock to the asset
quality. Suppose we are in a steady state equilibrium with trade, but that a certain fraction
of good assets turns into lemons independent of the holder of the asset being an owner or
a seller. We assume that the average quality of the asset drops unexpectedly at t = 0 to a
level (0) < minf;  g  min. There cannot be continuous trade, since the surplus function
  is strictly negative at t = 0. Furthermore, if there is no trade, the quality of assets for
13sale increases over time, but can never cross the threshold  where making an oer is a
strictly dominant strategy for a buyer, i.e. ~ (t) ! (0) < . Hence, there is an equilibrium
where the economy converges to the no trade steady state with no trade along the transition.
Finally, if the quality drops suciently, this no trade equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 3. Suppose the economy is in a steady state with trade, but there is a shock to
quality (0) < min. Then there cannot be an equilibrium with continuous trade, but there
exists an equilibrium with no trade for any t that converges to the steady state with no trade.






Proof. See Appendix A.
This implies that for a large enough shock to the asset quality the market will instantaneously
move from an equilibrium with trading to one without { our denition of a market freeze.
Note that even a small shock to  can permanently freeze the market when  > r as shown in
Figure 2. We turn next to the question whether an intervention in the form of permanently
buying assets can resurrect trading and how trading will respond to such an intervention.
4 Trading and Price Dynamics with Intervention
4.1 Intervention
We study now an intervention by a large (strategic) player { called market-maker-of-last-
resort (MMLR) { in response to an unanticipated quality shock that causes the market to
freeze.14 We assume throughout that (0) < minf;  g  min, so that there is a unique
steady state equilibrium of no trade and that without an intervention the economy converges
to this equilibrium with no trade along the transition. The MMLR purchases bad assets
which increases the average quality of the assets that are for sale after the intervention.
This action will also inuence trading behavior before the intervention takes place. As
buyers anticipate the market to recover in response to the asset purchase, they can have an
incentive to start buying assets before the intervention { a situation we call announcement
eect.
14In Appendix D, we discuss how a MMLR can use a dierent policy { a guaranteed price oor { to
respond to a self-fullling freeze by eliminating equilibria with less trade when multiple equilibria co-exist.
14More formally, an intervention is dened by an announcement at time t = 0 to permanently
purchase an amount of Q of lemons for a price P at some time T  0.15 We assume further
that the MMLR does not have information on the quality of an asset, but knows the average
quality (0) of assets after the unanticipated shock has occurred and trading has ceased
on the market. The MMLR can also commit to the policy, and meeting the MMLR is
frictionless; i.e. at time T every trader with a lemon has an equal chance to trade with the
MMLR. Finally, we assume that sellers of lemons that trade with the MMLR permanently
exit the economy.16 This leads to the following restriction on policies.
Denition 4. An intervention (T;Q;P) is feasible if







2. P 2 [v`(T);vs].
The rst condition restricts an intervention to achieve full trading in steady state. Purchasing
lemons raises the average quality of assets. In steady state, there will be trade as long as
(0)S
S   Q
  . (31)
We denote that threshold as Qmin and it yields an average quality of assets that are for sale
in steady state equal to
~   =
 
 + (1    )
=
r
r + (1   )
. (32)
The second condition implies that only lemons have an incentive to sell the asset to the
MMLR at the time of the intervention T. The price P cannot be too high as otherwise the
intervention would attract also good sellers. Also, lemons need a price that is high enough
to compensate them for the opportunity cost of remaining a seller with value v`(T).
The MMLR can provide an additional value through the intervention by increasing the price
and the quantity of assets purchased. We call this the option value of the intervention and
15We rule out purchasing good assets. This assumption is innocuous, if we assume that either the MMLR
does not enjoy the dividend ow from good assets { or suciently less so than the traders.
16This keeps the number of buyers constant at b = 1. As we discuss further below, we could also assume
that these sellers become buyers thereby increasing the total number of buyers. The intervention would then
become more powerful as it permanently increases liquidity in the market by changing the relative market
tightness in steady-state equilibrium via an increase in the number of buyers b.
15denote it by VI. To assess this option value, we look at the value of acquiring a lemon just















(P(T)   v`(T)) + v`(T) (33)
= VI + v`(T).
The rst term of this expression is the expected transfer of a trade with the MMLR at T
provided by the option value. If it is positive, the value function of a lemon has a downward
jump at T. The second term captures the case that, conditional on not being able to sell
to the MMLR, the lemon remains in the market. With an intervention at T, a fraction
Q=[S(1   (0))] of lemons have an option to sell their bad assets to the MMLR at a price
P(T). At price P(T) = v`(T), they are just indierent between selling to the MMLR or
remaining in the market. If the price is strictly higher, they strictly prefer to sell to the
MMLR as they receive an additional transfer. The option value VI is thus the dierence in
expected value they obtain from the intervention relative to a minimum one. We have
0  VI  vs   v`(T). (34)
Interestingly, given the minimum price, changing the size of the intervention P(T) = v`(T)
does not increase the option value of the intervention. The reason is that the chance to
transact with the MMLR or afterwards in the market are perfect substitutes from the per-
spective of an individual lemon. Only when the MMLR increases the price above v`(T) do
lemons obtain an additional transfer through the intervention.
The surplus function  (t) has thus a jump at T for two reason. The intervention increases
discretely the average quality ~ , but the value of a lemon v`(T) also jumps down at that
time, since a positive option value disappears for future lemon holders. More generally, the
surplus function depends only on the dynamics of ~ (t) and v`(t) over time, since buyers
extract all the rents from sellers with good assets, causing both vs and vo to be constant.








where m is the random time for the next trade opportunity where buyers are willing to buy
























16This shows that the option value VI of an intervention positively inuences market trading
before the intervention through its eects on v`(t). However, the option value is discounted
by the rate of time preference r and by the chance of selling a lemon prior to the intervention
on the market as expressed by the additional discount factor (t).
We rst characterize now the trading dynamics after the intervention. Our strategy is to work
backwards. This is possible, since any feasible intervention is consistent with equilibrium with
full trading after the intervention, independent of trading behavior before the intervention.
All that matters here is that the minimum scale of the intervention Qmin increases the
average quality of assets suciently. We then characterize the equilibrium structure before
the intervention which depends on the announcement eect and give some bounds for this
eect. Finally, we derive implications for transaction prices in equilibrium when there is an
intervention.
4.2 Trading Dynamics
4.2.1 Recovery After the Intervention
A minimum intervention, Qmin, raises the average quality of assets just enough above the
critical level so that there exists a steady state equilibrium with trade. But any feasible
intervention also raises the average quality of the assets above this critical level along the
time path after the intervention at T. Importantly, this result is independent of trading
behavior before the intervention. We denote the average quality of assets for sale right after
the intervention at T by ~ (T) and its long-run steady state level by ~ SS(Q).
Lemma 5. Consider any intervention Q 2 [Qmin;(1   (0))S] at time T. Then ~ (t)  ~   =
r
r+(1 ) for all [T;1). If there is full trade with (t) = 1 for all t 2 [T;1), the average
quality of assets for sale ~ (t) decreases monotonically to ~ SS(Q)  ~   on [T;1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is as follows. First, the oor for the average quality of asset that are for sale
is given by ~ (0). This corresponds to a situation where there is continuous trading and
the measure of sellers with good assets remains constant. When there is no trading at any
point in time, the average quality increases because more and more owners become sellers
over time due to preference shocks { or in other words, selling pressure builds up over time.
17Hence, it must be the case that s(t)  s(0) for all t < T. Second, the MMLR removes
only lemons from the market which causes a discrete jump in the average quality at time
T that is sucient to raise the oor for the average asset quality to at least ~   which is the
steady state level of the average quality of assets that are for sale when there is trading.
With trading, any built-up selling pressure will dissipate over time and the average quality
of assets for sale needs to converge to this oor in the long-run.
Based on this result, it follows that continuous trade after the intervention is indeed an
equilibrium. One needs to simply verify that buyers have an incentive to buy for any t 2
[T;1) given that there is trade at any later stage which causes the value of a lemon to be
constant at its steady state value. This is indeed the case as the quality of assets a buyer
purchases is suciently high and will decline over time. Hence, there is no reason to postpone
a purchase. As a result, the economy will converge monotonically to the new steady state
with trade.
Proposition 6. Continuous trade after the intervention is an equilibrium.
Proof. When trading, the buyer's take-it-or-leave-it-oer is given by p(t) = vs vb(t). Hence,
he will trade ((t) = 1) only if
 (t) = ~ (t)vo + (1   ~ (t))v`(t)   vs  0.
Suppose that (t0) = 1 for all t0 > t. Then, v`(t) = 
+rvs which is time independent. Thus,






r + (1   )
= ~  .
The result then follows from the previous lemma.
4.2.2 Recovery Before the Intervention
The intervention at time T can induce an announcement eect so that trading in the market
starts before the actual intervention. This can be understood best by looking at how the
intervention inuences the two components associated with the surplus function from trading,
 (t). The quality eect is backward looking. When there is no trading, selling pressure builds
up in the market (i.e. s(t) increases) which in turn increases the quality of assets that are
for sale ~ (t). This increases the willingness of buyers to purchase an asset today. Second,
there is a strategic complementarity which is forward looking. The possibility of selling a
18lemon in the future inuences the willingness to purchase an asset today. Hence, anticipating
the intervention which resurrects trading after T, buyers will start making oers as soon as
the quality for assets improves suciently. In equilibrium, the trading volume has of course
to be consistent with the decrease in the quality of assets when selling pressure diminishes
which yields the following trading dynamics.
Proposition 7. All equilibria before T can be characterized by two breaking points 1(T)  0
and 2(T) 2 [1;T) such that
(i) there is no trade ((t) = 0) in the interval [0;1),
(ii) there is partial trade ((t) 2 (0;1)) in the interval [1;2),
(iii) there is trade ((t) = 1) in the interval [2;T).
Proof. See Appendix A.
There are two breaking points. The rst one, 1(T), determines when some trading { partial
trade { takes place in the market again. With partial trade, buyers do not receive an expected
surplus as  (t) = 0. While welfare improves as some good assets get reallocated, lemons
extract all the rents from buyers. At a later point in time, at 2(T), the market fully recovers,
a situation we refer to simply as trade. Whenever 1(T) < T, there is an announcement
eect from committing at time 0 to an intervention at a later date. The intervention itself
of course inuences these breaking points. Delaying the intervention reduces the strategic
complementarity from a market recovery, but at the same time allows selling pressure to
build up which increases the average quality of assets for buyers. Increasing the size of the
intervention adds value to holding a lemon making it more attractive for buyers to make an
oer.
4.2.3 Announcement Eect
We give now some bounds on the announcement eect, since we cannot derive analytically
how changes in the intervention inuence this eect. First, unless the option value is positive,
there can only be partial trade prior to the intervention. This implies that there is a xed
costs associated with creating an announcement eect. Furthermore, if the initial quality
drop is suciently large, there will be no announcement eect at all, since the quality eect
is not strong enough to overcome the initial drop in quality. Second, for a large enough
19option value, it is always possible to delay the intervention while still maintaining trade
continuously in the market. The reason is that the MMLR can compensate a buyer fully for
acquiring a lemon with the maximum option value (VI = r
r+vs). This is sucient to make
the buyer's surplus positive provided the intervention is not delayed for too long.
Proposition 8. Suppose VI = 0. There cannot be trade with (t) = 1 for any interval before





, the unique equilibrium before the
intervention is no trade for any T (i.e. 1(T) = T).
Furthermore, there exists an equilibrium with continuous trade, if and only if







  vs  0. (37)
Proof. See Appendix A.
We discuss next how search frictions change the critical time T of the intervention so that an
announcement eect starts to arise. When there is no announcement eect { i.e., no trade




















vs < 0. (38)
The quality eect depends negatively on , when there is no trade. When search frictions
become less important, the average quality of assets for sale is lower to begin with. At the
same time, the complementarity is stronger, as it is easier to turn around a lemon. Totally



























since (0) < . When  > r, this expression is always negative. The intuition is that the
strategic complementarity is more important than the quality eect. As  increases, the
intervention becomes more powerful and the critical time T for an announcement eect to
occur drops. For r > , the quality eect dominates and how search frictions inuence the
announcement eects depends on the size of the shock (0).
204.3 Price Dynamics
Due to the take-it-or-leave-it oer, market prices in equilibrium with trading are given by
p(t) = vs   vb(t) (41)
and, hence, are inversely related to the value function of the buyer vb(t), which is a continuous
function. Their dynamics depend on the trading behavior over time. Once trading starts
again, there is a positive jump from zero to a price that is below the steady state price.
Interestingly, prices then behave non-monotonically: they rst decline with partial trade,
before recovering to their steady-state level.
Proposition 9. Given an intervention at T, prices p(t)
(i) are zero when there is no trade and continuous on [1;1),
(ii) decline at rate r with partial trade in the interval [1;2],
(iii) decline at a rate lower than r or increase with full trade in the interval (2;T],
(iv) and increase monotonically to the steady state price after the intervention with a pos-
itive, discrete jump in their growth rate at T.
Proof. See Appendix A.
With trade after the intervention, the quality of the assets ~ (t) drops over time, implying
less surplus. Hence, sellers will require a higher price, as becoming a buyer is less attractive.
Before the intervention at T, there is an additional second eect. The intervention discretely
increases the expected surplus from trading which is discounted by traders at the rate of time
preference. When there is trading before the intervention, these two eects work against each
other giving rise to the the non-monotonicity in prices. With partial trade, the expected
surplus remains at zero, so that the buyer has to simply compensate the seller less as one
approaches the intervention.
We can quite easily compare the price range of an intervention with the market price. The
MMLR can pay a higher price for assets than the transaction price in the market at the
time of the intervention. That occurs, when he chooses to pay the full price for the asset
and the surplus for buyers is strictly positive at the time of the intervention, i.e. P(T) =
21vs > p(T) = vs  vb(T). This of course is an artefact of our assumption that lemons have to
leave the market permanently upon selling to the MMLR. At the minimum price Pmin, the
MMLR pays a lower price when search friction increase, as lemons have a lower expected
value when sold in the market.
5 Optimal Intervention
5.1 The Cost of Intervention
In order to study the optimal intervention, we need to adopt a social welfare function for
the MMLR that takes into account the costs of the intervention against the benets of the
market allocating assets among traders with dierent valuations. Our welfare function is












The rst term describes the surplus from allocating good assets to traders with high valuation
and captures the benets from intervening to resurrect the market. The second term ex-
presses the costs of nancing the intervention. The costs are a direct transfer to traders in the
market and due to linear utility are zero sum. Hence, we introduce a parameter  2 (0;1)
which expresses the social costs of intervening as being proportional to the costs.17




(P   v`). (43)
We can thus represent the minimum costs associated with an intervention at time T and









r+vs  ^ VI
r+




r+vs  ^ VI  VI  r
r+vs.
(44)
The cost function is time-invariant, piece-wise linear in VI and strictly convex around a kink
that occurs at the policy that sets P = vs and Q = Qmin. The reason is that in order to
17One can interpret these costs as the distortions from having to tax the economy to provide this transfer
to traders. Note that this set-up implies immediately that there is no role for the MMLR of buying lemons
when the market is functioning. There is a (social) cost of nancing the intervention, but no benet as the
intervention does not aect the allocation of good assets in steady state.
22achieve any given VI, increasing the quantity Q involves a deadweight cost. The MMLR
just provides a transfer of utility to current lemons otherwise provided for by future buyers.
However, after the MMLR pays a price equal to the good asset, he needs to increase the
quantity to achieve a higher option value VI.18 The net present value of costs is simply given
by C(VI)e rT if the intervention takes place at T. For the purpose of characterizing optimal
policies, we can thus represent any feasible intervention simply by (T;VI).
5.2 Optimal Timing { Continuously Functioning Markets
When analyzing the decision for the MMLR to delay, we look at the special case how to best
ensure that markets function continuously, i.e. how to ensure that there is trade at all t in
response to an unanticipated shock (0). There are two options available: the MMLR could
either intervene immediately and raise the quality of assets for sale suciently; or he could
delay the intervention for some time, but increase the option value VI. In either case, the
economy jumps immediately to a new steady state at t = 0, with the number of good assets
for sale being constant over time at s(t) = 
+S(0) and the amount of lemons decreasing
at the time of the intervention.
The optimal policy for the MMLR is simply to minimize the net present value of costs.
In order to delay, the net present value of the option value has to be suciently high to






1   ~ (0)
(vs   vo) +
r
r + 
vs > 0. (45)
Hence, delaying involves a xed cost. Moreover, for a policy to ensure continuous trading,
it needs to increase VI suciently when delaying the intervention. Totally dierentiating







Traders discount the option value VI by more than the rate of time preference. They take into
account that trading opportunities arrive in the market with ow . When selling the lemon
to a buyer, they give up the additional transfer oered by the MMLR. Hence, the eective
discount rate of an intervention is r +  > r. The xed cost combined with the increased
discount rate for the option value leads to increasing costs when delaying the intervention.
18This is somewhat an artefact of the MMLR not being able to sell back any additional amount of lemons
Q   Qmin to the market immediately after the intervention at a price equal to v`    (see Appendix E).
23Proposition 10. To ensure continuous markets ((t) = 1 for all t), it is optimal to intervene
immediately, or T  = 0 and V 
I = 0.
Proof. The problem for the MMLR is to minimize the costs of any intervention that ensures
continuous trade for all t. Taking into account the xed cost given by P = vs, the cost








































Hence, it is never optimal to increase VI and, hence, never optimal to delay the intervention
in order to achieve continuously functioning markets.
It is instructive to stress that the minimum jump in the option value is given by
V
min









the point at which the kink occurs in the cost function which is associated with the highest
price of the intervention P = vs. The intuition is as follows. Suppose the intervention takes
place at T = 0 where the MMLR buys Qmin at P = v`. Then, the MMLR transacts with
already existing lemons and he needs to pay a price that just makes them indierent to stay
a lemon and wait for a trade later in the market. Consider now T =  small, but positive.
Then, the MMLR needs to convince a buyer to purchase a lemon in the market just before
the intervention at T  , even though the quality of the asset he purchases is still ~ (0). He can
do so, by oering an additional option value that compensates the buyer for taking on the
increased risk of purchasing a lemon. The compensation required is exactly purchasing Qmin
lemons at the price the buyer paid for in the market. But this price is p = vs vb(t) = vs for
a minimum intervention. Hence, P = vs. Of course, as  > 0, discounting requires a larger
24intervention than Qmin to compensate buyers that purchased an asset at T = 0. Letting
 ! 0, however, we obtain exactly the xed cost being at the kink of the cost function.
Hence, the MMLR can only delay if he pays the fair market price P = vs for the good asset.
Once the MMLR pays the fair price for lemons, any increases in the quantity Q are very
costly making a delay of the intervention not optimal.19
5.3 Optimal Size of the Intervention { A Bang-Bang Result
The reasoning of the previous section can be used to evaluate optimal policies in terms of VI
more generally. To do so, we look at how certain marginal policy changes in a neighborhood
of some initial policy (T;VI) change the net present value of costs. The idea for the marginal
policy change is to keep the net present value of the option value constant { like in expression
(46) {, but for an arbitrary, xed trading probability (T  ) just before the intervention at
T. It turns out that the cost-minimizing policy among these policies sets VI = ^ VI.




for all (T;VI) with T > 0 and VI > 0. For such changes, the net present value of costs is
minimized at ^ VI.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We establish now that it is never optimal to increase the quantity of assets to be purchased.
In other words, Q = Qmin. This result can be understood as follows. Suppose it were
optimal for the MMLR to buy more lemons. Then, it must be the case that VI > ^ VI. He
could alternatively reduce the amount purchased and intervene earlier. Consider then a
marginal policy change as in Lemma 11. This change will reduce the net present value of
costs. But it will also leave the incentives to trade before the new, earlier intervention date
unchanged. This implies that the MMLR increases welfare by lowering VI towards ^ V { or
equivalently, by setting Q = Qmin.
19When there is a lag between observing the market freeze and being able to intervene, this result implies
that the MMLR can still achieve continuous trade by announcing an intervention immediately. This would,
however, require a larger than the minimal intervention at price P = vs. Interestingly, the larger the search
friction becomes { i.e. the smaller  {, the more the MMLR could delay, since the market discounts the
transfer provided by VI less.
25By similar reasoning, we obtain a slightly weaker result for the optimal price P . Consider
a situation where there is full trade before the intervention, i.e. (T  ) = 1. Then, by
Proposition 8, we know that the MMLR needs to provide a strictly positive option value VI.
This time, he could delay the intervention and increase VI according to a marginal policy
change that leaves (t) = 1 unchanged for all t > T. As this lowers the net present value of
costs, welfare again increases. However, due to the xed cost of incurring a positive option
value, it could be still better to intervene earlier, but at the minimum price P. This leads to
the \bang-bang" result that an optimal intervention either oers the highest or the lowest
price, while always purchasing the minimum amount of assets.
Proposition 12. Any optimal policy with intervention (T  < 1) features Q = Qmin.
Furthermore, if 2(T ) < T , the optimal policy either features P = v` or P = vs.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The relative weight between costs and benets of an intervention, , determines the opti-
mal timing decision. If the social costs are small, but positive, it is optimal to intervene
immediately. Conversely, if they become large, it is best not to intervene and let the market
be frozen. A formal statement and proof of this result are relegated to Appendix F. Given
these results, one would expect that for intermediate values of , it is optimal to have a
delayed intervention. When the intervention is delayed, equilibria exhibit generically partial
trading before the intervention. Hence, welfare cannot be computed analytically anymore,
as our linear dierential equations have time-dependent coecients. We will thus resort to
numerically solve for the optimal policy { especially the optimal timing of the intervention
{ in a calibrated version of our economy.
6 Numerical Analysis
6.1 Parameter Values
We calibrate our economy to capture the market for longer-term structured nance prod-
ucts such as asset-backed securities (ABS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO). We
then interpret private information concerning the quality  of the assets as reecting the
opaqueness associated with the tranches of these assets. In our benchmark, assets are of
26very high quality with an average of  = 0:99 being good assets. This is consistent with
Aaa rated corporate debt which historically has a default rate of 1.09% and 2.38% for 10
and 20 year maturities respectively and a recovery rate of about 50% (see Moody's Investor
Service, 2000). Similar impairment probabilities were associated with Aaa rated tranches of
structured debt products before 2007 (see Moody's Investor Service, 2010). In accordance
with Due, Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) we set the annual interest rate r to 5% and the
fraction of investors holding an asset to S=(1 + S) = 0:8.
We then select two key parameters in our analysis, the degree of search frictions  and the
arrival rate of a liquidity shock , to match annual turnover rates for debt products. A search
intensity of  = 100 for the benchmark implies that a seller expects to contact a buyer and
to sell the asset if there is trade once every 250=100 = 2:5 trading days. We set  to 1 so
that an asset holder remains an owner for an average of one year. With the proportion of







+ 1   

= 1:98, (48)
so that assets change hands about twice in a year on average. This is not inconsistent, but
at the upper end of the turnover rate reported by the literature.20 Later on, we conduct a
robustness check with respect to the parameter , which reects the need of turning around
an asset in the secondary market. We view shorter and medium-term funding markets (e.g.
commercial paper) as markets where traders face more frequent liquidity needs (higher ).
Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
  S  x r 
100 1 4 1 0:035 0:05 0:99
Table 1 gives the values of the exogenous parameters and Table 2 describes the resulting
steady-state equilibrium. Note that with our parameters, trades in good assets vs. lemons
are approximately 4 to 1. As in Due, Garleanu and Pedersen (2007), we have normalized
 = 1. The valuation shock is chosen to match the spread of highly rated structure nance
products over the risk-free rate r. The yield is 1=17:4578 = 5:728% or 73 pbs above the
risk-free rate.21 As shown in Table 2, due to search frictions, a small fraction of good
20Bao, Pan and Wang (2008) give turnover rates between one and two years for corporate bonds, while
Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) report a slightly lower annual rate in the range of 0.8-1.2 (see also
Edwards, Harris and Piwowar, 2007). Data for structured products are not readily available.
21This is the total spread in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2010) for corporate debt of the highest
quality. Gorton and Metrick (2010) report a range of 50 to 100 bps on highly rated ABS before 2007.
27assets { s=(S) = 0:98% of the total { is misallocated to investors with a liquidity shock.
Also, since  > r, the strategic complementarity dominates the quality eect, implying that
  < . However, the steady state equilibrium falls in the range of multiple equilibria so that
it matters whether a trader can resell the asset when receiving a liquidity shock.
Table 2: Benchmark Steady-state Equilibrium
b o s ` p ~    
1 3:9208 0:0392 0:04 17:4578 0:4950 0:9669 0:9983
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium outcome for dierent combinations of the asset quality 
and the search friction  in steady state. The red marks indicate the baseline calibration.
As shown, a negative shock to asset quality can cause a steady state equilibrium without
trade. If the shock is suciently large, the unique equilibrium path features no trade after
































Eq. with trade/mixing/no trade
Eq. with no trade
Exist eq. with no trade
Unique eq. with no trade
Figure 4: Steady-state Equilibrium and Transition after Shock
286.2 Trading and Price Dynamics
We now consider a negative quality shock at t = 0 such that 10% of the assets turn from good
to lemons, i.e., (0) = 0:89 <  .22 In order to resurrect the market, the MMLR needs to
purchase at least an amount Qmin = 0:3182 which is about 8% of the total asset supply and
72% of lemons. We rst compute the equilibrium trading response (t) and the associated
market price p(t) for three dierent values of , when there is a minimum intervention at
time T = 0:25 (see Figure 5).

























Figure 5: Equilibrium Prices and Trading Dynamics (T = 0:25, VI = 0) { Impact of Search
Friction
The price jumps up when the market starts to recover at 1, and drops slightly over time at
the rate of r as trading activity increases. After the intervention time T, full trade is restored
with the price increasing monotonically towards the steady-state level. With smaller search
frictions (higher ), the market recovers earlier. But with partial trading the fraction of
buyers making oers, (t), is also decreasing in . The reason is that with less search
frictions there cannot be too much trading, as otherwise the quality of assets for sale would
drop too fast in order to maintain a mixing equilibrium. Furthermore, a higher  tends to
increase the asset price and speed up its convergence.
22Such a shock falls within the range experienced in the nancial crisis of 2007-09 where impairment rates
on structured nance products with Aaa and Aa ratings jumped to a range of 5-20% depending on the
product (see Moody's Investor Service, 2010).

























Figure 6: Equilibrium Prices and Trading Dynamics (T = 0:25) { Impact of Option Value
VI
For the benchmark case where  = 100, Figure 6 examines the eects of increasing the price
of the intervention P while holding Q xed at Qmin. Such an increase in VI strengthens the
strategic complementarity. Hence, it induces the market to recover earlier. It also raises
trading activity before the intervention which in turn increases the market price. This is due
to a faster drop in the average quality of assets that are for sale when there is more trading
in the market.
6.3 Announcement Eect
We turn next to the announcement eect. In particular, we are interested in how the time of
intervention inuences the timing and intensity of market recovery. As a rst pass, Figure 7
looks at the time when the market starts to respond to a minimum intervention { Qmin and
Pmin { as a function of the time of intervention T. More precisely, we plot the breaking time
1(T) again for the three dierent levels of the search friction , with the solid line indicating
our baseline case. We only plot 1(T) here, since there is no full recovery (2(T) = T) in all
three cases.
Postponing the intervention delays the market recovery (0
1(T) > 0), but increases the an-
nouncement eect in the sense that the market recovers earlier relative to T (0
1(T)  1).
The interpretation is that it takes time for selling pressure to build up suciently to coun-




















Figure 7: Announcement Eect I{ Impact of Search Friction  and Intervention Time T
teract the lemons problem via the quality eect. For small T, however, the quality eect
is too small for the announcement eect to kick in. Finally, varying , but holding the
intervention time T xed, the market recovers earlier when the search friction is lower { or,
d1(T)=d < 0. The reason here is that for  > r the strategic complementarity is more
important than the quality eect (see our earlier discussion of equations (38) and (39)).
This however gives an incomplete picture of how eective the intervention is. As Figure 5
shows, the recovery depends not only on the time when trading starts, but also on the speed
at which trading picks up again. We look therefore at two dierent measures of trading
activity to assess the eects of an intervention. The rst measure looks at the average time
it takes a trader to sell an asset before the intervention T. Since in equilibrium we face a








0 (u)du , (49)
where the denominator reects the probability to sell at some time before the intervention
actually takes place. This measure is clearly inuenced by the degree of the search friction
. We therefore normalize this measure by the average time of selling an asset before T in
31the steady state equilibrium with full trade.23



























































Figure 8: Announcement Eect II { Average Time of Selling an Asset before T (Normalized)
Figure 8 shows the average time it takes to sell an asset as a multiple of the one in normal
times. As the intervention is postponed, the delay in selling time rises as the announcement
eect increases less than proportional with the time of intervention. Most interestingly, when
there are more trading frictions ( decreases), the average selling time for investors is closer
to normal times.
Since selling pressure builds up during a market freeze, our second measures looks at the total
trading volume before T to assess how the intervention inuences overall market activity.
This measures is given by
M2 =
R T













where we have already normalized our measure by the steady state trading volume in normal
times. Note that with continuous trade, we would again have M2 = 1. Figure 9 gives the




1   e T :
which is normalized by the corresponding probability in the normal time. However, this measure would miss
the timing dimension.
32trading volume associated with an intervention at time T as a percentage of normal times
and shows that postponing the intervention time has a non-monotonic eect.























































Figure 9: Announcement Eect III { Trading Volume before T (Normalized)
For a given , the trading volume relative to normal times stays zero for small T. The
reason is that it takes time for quality to build up in order to create some announcement
eect. Once this eect kicks in, the trading volume is increasing in T because delaying the
intervention allows selling pressure to build up. The selling pressure, however, begins to
dissipate once trading starts again. As the intervention is delayed further, market recovery
is delayed and trading volume relative to normal times converges to 0. In markets with
lower search frictions, trading volume recovers and peaks faster but at a lower overall level.
The reason is that, when search frictions are small, quality improves quickly without trade,
leading to a faster recovery. However, low search frictions imply that the quality would drop
rapidly when there is trade, leading to a more subdued recovery of trading volume when the
intervention is delayed.
Overall, search frictions determine the impact of an intervention on market activity. A
market with high search frictions recovers later because the quality eect kicks in slower,
and the diculty of nding a counterparty reduces the absolute magnitude of the strategic
complementarity. On the other hand, an intervention is more eective in a relative sense by
bringing the market closer to its trading volume in normal times, albeit requiring a longer
time to take eect.
336.4 Optimal Policy
We now turn to computing the optimal policy for the scenario where the quality drops by
10% leading to a market freeze. The optimal intervention depends on the (social) costs of
the intervention which is captured by the parameter . Figure 10 shows the optimal timing
and pricing of the intervention as a function of  for our benchmark economy.





































Figure 10: Optimal Intervention for the Benchmark Economy
When  is small, an immediate intervention is optimal which implies that there is no reason
to increase the option value VI. As the value of  increases, it is optimal to delay the
intervention (T > 0) more and more and provide a positive option value (VI > 0) in order to
maximize the announcement eect. Table 3 veries our bang-bang result: the price is always
set to Pmax when there is sucient delay, while the quantity of purchases remains constant
at the minimum Qmin.
To put these numbers into perspective, in our baseline calibration, when the deadweight loss
of taxation is roughly 5%, the optimal policy is to commit to asset purchases about 3 weeks
later. The market will respond by starting to recover gradually about 9 trading days after
the market freezes in response to the quality shock. Finally, we address how the optimal
intervention will take into account the severity of the trading frictions in the market. Table
4 reports the results for a market where trading in normal times takes 10 days ( = 25).
The qualitative pattern of the optimal intervention is the same. The MMLR, however, needs
to purchase a higher minimum amount of assets. Nonetheless, the optimal intervention is
34Table 3: Optimal Intervention ( = 100)
 T P Q 1
0.0100 0 19.2904 0.3182 0
0.0200 0 19.2904 0.3182 0
0.0300 0.0112 19.2904 0.3182 0.0112
0.0400 0.0472 19.2987 0.3182 0.0295
0.0500 0.0593 19.2987 0.3182 0.0365
0.1000 0.1217 19.2987 0.3182 0.0729
0.1500 0.1858 19.2987 0.3182 0.1111
0.2000 0.2474 19.2987 0.3182 0.1486
0.3000 0.3828 19.2987 0.3182 0.2335
0.4000 0.5253 19.2987 0.3182 0.3266
0.5000 0.6767 19.2987 0.3182 0.4295
now more aggressive by choosing a smaller T. The reason is twofold. First, the maximal
intervention price drops because the reservation value of a lemon is lower when  declines.
Hence, the overall cost impact from the larger asset purchase is dampened. Second, and more
importantly, the announcement eect is decreasing in the trading friction for our parameter
values. Hence, the MMLR has less incentives to delay and to rely on this eect in order
to save costs. Quantitatively, once it becomes optimal to delay and increase the price for
lemons, the dierence in policy becomes very small in response to the trading friction. Hence,
we draw the cautious conclusion from this analysis that ensuring market continuity is more
warranted for markets that are (i) more important relative to the social costs of intervention
and (ii) more riddled by trading frictions.
6.5 Robustness
6.5.1 High Liquidity Needs
In our benchmark, owners return to the market with an average frequency of once a year.
We now consider a dierent situation where liquidity shocks hit owners of assets more often.
Keeping  = 100 and  = 0:99 and setting  = 10 implies that an owner expects to return
to the market every 25 trading days resulting in an annual turnover rate of roughly 10 (see
35Table 4: Optimal Intervention Policy ( = 25)
 T P Q 1
0.0100 0 19.2615 0.3215 0
0.0200 0 19.2615 0.3215 0
0.0300 0 19.2615 0.3215 0
0.0400 0 19.2615 0.3215 0
0.0500 0 19.2615 0.3215 0
0.1000 0.0360 19.2615 0.3215 0.0360
0.1500 0.1738 19.2944 0.3215 0.1140
0.2000 0.2434 19.2944 0.3215 0.1571
0.3000 0.3820 19.2944 0.3215 0.2456
0.4000 0.5269 19.2944 0.3215 0.3420
0.5000 0.6799 19.2944 0.3215 0.4479
equation (48)).
As shown in Table 5, a rise in  requires a larger fraction of assets to be of good quality for
trade to be a steady state equilibrium. Even though the average quality of asset ~  for sale
improves, a buyer expects a high valuation for the dividend of the asset for a much shorter
duration. Buyers are thus less willing to trade, which leads to a higher cut-o points for
trade. Hence, a market freeze becomes more likely even though the quality in the market
improves.
Table 5: Steady-state masses and asset price
 b o s ` p ~    
10 1 3:6000 0:3600 0:04 17:5642 0:9000 0:9682 0:9998
1 1 3:9458 0:0158 0:0384 18:4 0:2913 0:9285 0:9904
Figure 11 illustrates how the market response to an intervention changes with . Given our
parameter values, in a market with high , an intervention generates a smaller announcement
eect, with later recovery and lower trading activities. Since  lowers the value of being a
buyer, the trading price has to be higher to induce sellers to become buyers again.24 For
24A higher  also reduces Qmin slightly, but this change has a negligible eect.





















Figure 11: Equilibrium Price and Trading Dynamics (T = 0:25, VI = 0) { Impact of Liquidity
Needs 
completeness, we also report the optimal policy. Most importantly, the MMLR will be more
aggressive in ensuring continuously functioning markets, as traders access the market more
frequently to deal with liquidity shocks.
Table 6: Optimal Intervention Policy ( = 10)
 T P Q 1
0.0100 0 19.2904 0.3231 0
0.0200 0 19.2904 0.3231 0
0.0300 0 19.2904 0.3231 0
0.0400 0 19.2904 0.3231 0
0.0500 0 19.2904 0.3231 0
0.1000 0 19.2904 0.3231 0
0.1500 0 19.2904 0.3231 0
0.2000 0.0073 19.2904 0.3231 0.0073
0.3000 0.0373 19.2986 0.3231 0.0258
0.4000 0.0531 19.2986 0.3231 0.0364
0.5000 0.0701 19.2986 0.3231 0.0484
376.5.2 The Liquidity Channel of Policy
We have assumed throughout that when traders sell lemons to the MMLR they exit the
market forever. This assumption kept the market tightness constant in the long-run. Suppose
now instead that traders who sell lemons to the MMLR can stay in the market and become
buyers again after they sold to the MMLR. An intervention can then have more powerful
eects, since it increases market liquidity permanently by raising the number of buyers in
the market from 1 to 1 + Q. This reinforces the strategic complementarity, since we have
now for the value of a lemon after full recovery that
v`(t) =
(1 + Q)





for all t  2(T). We call this additional eect of an intervention liquidity channel.



































Figure 12: Equilibrium Price and Trading Dynamics { Liquidity Channel
Figure 12 compares the equilibrium trading dynamics of an intervention with and without
this liquidity channel of policy. As shown, the liquidity channel quantitatively plays only a
small role. The value function for lemons is almost identical for our benchmark economy,
and thus the market price and trading dynamics are only slightly altered by this additional
eect.25
25The liquidity channel might empirically be even less relevant, as there could be entry and exit of traders
in a specic market. Also, the shock to quality could be temporary with the MMLR being able to lay o
some of the assets purchased after recovery leaving market tightness unchanged in the long-run.
387 Discussion
We have shown in this paper that search frictions are important for understanding why some
markets are more prone to be fragile when there is adverse selection. It is not surprising
that a simple policy of purchasing lemons in the market by a government or central bank
can alleviate the adverse selection problem. However, we have also shown that there is
an announcement eect: simply announcing the intervention can induce investors to start
trading again. This eect gives then rise to an interesting trade-o between between the size
and the timing of the intervention which in turn depends on the degree of search frictions.
Our paper provides then some guidance for policy makers when to intervene and in what
form. In particular, we can rationalize intervention to ensure market continuity when a
particular asset market is deemed suciently important. Nonetheless, our analysis has
abstracted from some interesting aspects.
A stark assumption in our analysis makes the shock to the quality of the asset permanent.
With a random recovery time for (0) to jump back to the original level our results might
change. If the initial shock is small and recovery relatively likely, the market might just
function continuously on its own. Also, there might be an incentive now to delay the inter-
vention { even if the MMLR would like to ensure continuous markets. Delaying saves costs
in expected terms, even if this requires an increase in the size of the intervention VI. Also,
once the asset quality recovers, the MMLR has the option to sell back some of the assets it
has acquired. This might induce it to intervene earlier as now the expected costs of transfers
have decreased.
A related issue is that the type of shock might also matter for optimal policy. Suppose
instead that the average quality of assets stays constant, but the market tightness temporarily
increases as some potential buyers leave the market, i.e. b drops. This will lower the
strategic complementarity and therefore can also lead to a market breakdown. A large
player can again intervene, but there is no an important dierence. He will buy lemons at a
depressed price, being able to seller them later at a higher price when the market recovers.
The policy then looks like market-making-of-last-resort rather than buying-of-last-resort.
Since there is a potential for prot now, private market-makers could have an incentive to
stabilize the market provided they have access to liquidity.
Another interesting detail of the announcement eect is that there is a time-consistency
problem. Suppose for the moment that investors believe the announcement that the inter-
vention will take place at some time T > 0 and start trading. The MMLR has then an
39incentive at T to surprise the market by postponing the intervention for a small interval.
Even if the market would freeze for a short period, this could mean saving costs by delaying
the intervention. Investors will then view such announcements as not credible. To solve
this time-consistency problem, the MMLR might have to spread out purchases over time,
thereby reducing the gains from delaying the intervention.
We have also not looked at another, related problem. The quality shock is exogenous in
our model. Suppose, however, that investors can create new assets. Anticipating that a
MMLR will resurrect the market, investors will have an incentive to create lemons. In other
words, a moral hazard problem arises from intervening in the event of a market freeze. This
shifts the emphasis from intervention to improving the infrastructure in certain markets such
as over-the-counter markets. Our paper has unveiled two avenues for reducing the inherent
fragility in these markets: improving the transparency of assets traded and increasing market
liquidity. We leave a detailed analysis of the last two issues for future work.
40Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
In steady state, the surplus function is positive, if and only if the steady state measure of
sellers satises s  
+Smin. Hence, if at time 0, the quality drops to (0) < min,
 (0) < 0 and there cannot be continuous trade.
If there is no trade for any t, the law of motion for good assets that are for sale is given by
_ s(t) =  _ o(t) = o(t).
Since the fraction of good assets drops to S(0) at time t = 0, the initial condition is given
by s(0) = 
+S(0). This implies that the fraction of good assets on the market for sale
at time t, ~ (t), is increasing monotonically to (0).
Since v`(t) = 0 for all t, we are left to verify that
~ (t)vo   vs  0.
for all t. We have that ~ (t) < (0) for all t and ~ (t) ! (0) as t ! 1. Hence, there exists
an equilibrium with no trade as long as
(0)vo   vs  0
or, equivalently, (0)  .
To show uniqueness, consider the buyer's surplus if there is trade ((t) = 1) for all t. Since
supt ~ (t)  (0), it suces to show that
(0)vo + (1   (0))v`   vs  0,





= ~   =
 
 + (1    )
=
r
r + (1   )
it is a strictly dominant strategy not to buy an asset at any time t, which completes the
proof.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Let T be the time of intervention by the MMLR and assume that the MMLR removes
Q  Qmin assets. We show rst that ~ (t) declines for any interval in [T;1) where (t) = 1.
41For this case, the law of motion is given by
_ ` = 0 (A.1)
_ s(t) = o(t)   s(t) (A.2)
_ o(t) =  o(t) + s(t). (A.3)

















+ (1   e (+)(t )) + s()e (+)(t ) + (1   (0))S   Q
which gives up to a constant
@~ (t)
@t
=  ( + )e







If there has been continuous trade from t = 0 until , i.e. (t) = 1 for all t 2 [0;], we have
that s() = s(0) = S(0) 
+. Hence, ~ (t) is constant as long as (t) = 1.
If there has not been full trade at some time before , i.e. (t) < 1 for some [t1;t2]  [0;],
it must be the case that s() > s(0) = S(0) 
+ which completes the proof of the rst
statement.
For the second result, notice that the average quality of assets for sale with a minimum
intervention Qmin = S(1  
(0)




+S(0) + S(1   (0))   Q
=
 
 + (1   ) 
= ~  . (A.5)
We denote this level by ~ SS(Qmin). Any intervention Q > Qmin will lead to ~ (T +) >
~ SS(Qmin) and by the previous lemma, we have that ~ (T +) declines monotonically. Since
s(t) ! s(0), we obtain immediately that ~ (t) ! ~ SS(Q)  ~ SS(Qmin) =  
+(1  ) for
t ! 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 7
First, we show that once the surplus function  (t) becomes positive it has to stay positive.
42Lemma A.1. If  (t0)  0 for some t0 < T, then  (t1)  0 for all t1 2 (t0;T).
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists a t1 2 (t0;T) such that  (t1) < 0. As   is continuous,
this implies that there must be an interval (0;1)  (t0;t1) where there is no trade, i.e.
(t) = 0. But then, over this interval, the average quality ~ (t) increases and we have that
_ v`(t) = v`(T  )e r(T t)r > 0. Hence,  (t) must be strictly increasing over this interval
starting out at  (0) = 0. A contradiction.
This implies that after there was some trade in the economy ((t) > 0), we cannot have no
trade ((t) = 0) anymore and the surplus function  (t) has to stay non-negative. We next
show that with full trade ((t) = 1) in some interval, the surplus function has to be strictly
convex.
Lemma A.2. If (t) = 1 for some interval [t0;t1] with t1 < T, then  (t) is strictly convex
over this interval.
Proof. We have
 (t) = ~ (t)(vo   v`(t)) + (v`(t)   vs) (A.6)
_  (t) = _ ~ (t)(vo   v`(t)) + (1   ~ (t))_ v`(t) (A.7)
  (t) =  ~ (t)(vo   v`(t))   2_ ~ (t)_ v`(t) + (1   ~ (t)) v`(t). (A.8)
We will show that  (t) is strictly convex if it is positive and strictly increasing. Assuming
(t) = 1 for the asset quality and omitting time indexes, we have




 ~  =  _ ~ 
_ s
s + `
+ (1   ~ )




Since (t) = 1, _ ~ (t) < 0. Also, we either have continuous trade or we need to have a region
with less than full trade ((t) < 1) before. Assume w.l.o.g. that  (t) crosses zero from below
at time t0. Hence, at t0, we need that the right-hand derivative _  (t
+
0 ) > 0. This can only be
the case if _ v`(t
+










43Hence, _ v`(t) > 0 for t 2 [t0;t1] if and only if _ v`(t
+
0 ) > 0. This implies that v`(t) is a strictly
increasing and strictly convex function over this interval. Hence, the last two terms are
positive in the expression for   (t). Note that vo   v`(t) > 0. If  ~ (t) is positive we are done.
Suppose to the contrary that  ~ (t) < 0. As long as _  (t) > 0 over the interval, it must be the
case that
0 < vo   v`(t) <  
1   ~ (t)
_ ~ (t)
_ v`(t). (A.12)
Using this in the expression for   (t), it suces to show that
   ~ (t)
1   ~ (t)
_ ~ (t)


























+ ( + r) > 0 (A.15)
( + ) + (r + ) > 0 (A.16)
which completes the proof.
The proposition follows now directly as a corollary from this lemma. Without trade, it must
be the case that the surplus function  (t) is increasing over time, as both _ ~  > 0 and _ v` > 0.
Once the surplus function becomes strictly positive, it cannot decrease anymore, as it is
strictly convex. Hence, _   > 0 whenever (t) = 1 is an equilibrium.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Suppose that 0  2(T) < T. Then, ~ (t) declines over [2;T], while v`(t) = v`(T). Hence,
the surplus from trade  (t) declines as well over this interval. Also, it must be the case that
(t) < 1 for t 2 [0;2) given the initial shock (0) < min. Hence,  (t)  0 for [0;2). Since
 (t) must be continuous over [0;T), this implies that  (t) < 0 for (2;T]. A contradiction.
44For the second part, note that the surplus for buyers is given by
 (t) = ~ (t)vo + (1   ~ (t))v`(t))   vs
< (0)vo + (1   (0))v`(T)   vs
 ~ minvo   (1   ~ min)v`   vs
= 0.
Hence, the surplus from trading is strictly negative for any t0 < T prior to the intervention,
even if there is trade with (t) = 1 for all T > t > t0. Hence, it is a strictly dominant
strategy not to trade.
For the last statement, note rst that if there is trade from t = 0 onward, the quality of
assets for sale remains unchanged at ~ (0) until the intervention takes place at T. Suppose
rst that condition (37) is satised. We then have that
 (t) >  (0)  0 (A.17)
for all t 2 (0;T], as v`(t) = 
+rvs +VIe (r+)T is strictly increasing when there is trading for
all t. If the condition does not hold, it is optimal to not trade for t suciently close to 0,
even if there is trade forever afterwards.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 9
Since there is no trade in the interval [0;1), we set p(t) = 0. For [1;2), there is partial
trade. The expected surplus  (t) is constant at zero in this interval which implies for the
value function of the buyer that
vb(t) = vb(2)e
 r(2 t). (A.18)
Since prices are given by p(t) = vs   vb(t), they decrease at a rate r.
For the interval [2;T), we have that the dierential equation of buyers is given by
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45which means that the price can decline at most at rate r which is less than with partial
trade.
Finally, we turn to the the interval [T;1). After the intervention we have for the dierential
equation of buyers
_ vb(t)   rvb(t) =  







Note that the right-hand side of this expression is strictly negative and continuously increas-
ing as _ s(t) < 0. Dierentiating the dierential equation for vb(t), we obtain
@ _ vb(t)
@t
= r_ vb(t)   _ s(t)(vo   vs). (A.23)
If _ vb(t) > 0, vb(t) is strictly convex and continuity of vb(t) in (T;1) would imply that it
diverges. This is a contradiction since vb(t) is bounded from above.
Hence, vb(t) is strictly decreasing implying that prices are increasing or _ p(t) > 0. Finally,















which implies that limt!1 p(t) = p = vs   vb(Q).
For the last statement in the proposition, note that vb(t) is continuous, but has a discrete
jump in its derivative as  (T) jumps discretely at the time of intervention. The left- and
right-hand derivative both exist at T and are given by
_ vb(T

















We thus obtain for their dierence









































Using the denition of VI,
_ vb(T)   _ vb(T
 ) = 






= Q(P   vs) (A.28)
 0,
46where the last inequality follows from P  vs. Hence, at T, the derivative jumps down
discretely and thus, the derivative of the price function increases discretely.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 11













Let VI > V min



















for all VI. Hence, the net present value of costs is increasing in the marginal policy change
(T;VI).
Now, let VI < V min









if and only if
VIS(1   (0)) <
r
r + 





















Since VIS(1   (0))  Qmin
r
r+vs, we have that the right-hand side of the last expression is
bounded below by (r + )=(r + ) > 1 when   1. Hence, the net present value of costs
is decreasing in the marginal policy change (T;VI).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 12
For establishing that Q = Qmin we distinguish two cases, full (2(T) < T) and partial
recovery (1(T) < 2(T) = T) before the intervention given any policy (T;VI).
Consider rst any policy (T;VI) for which VI > V min
I and 2(T) < T. We construct a cheaper
policy (T 0;V 0
I) that leaves the incentives to trade unchanged at any t. Dene the new time
of intervention by T 0 = T    2 (2(T);T) and dene the new size of the intervention





47Since  (t) > 0 for all [T 0;1), this leaves v`(T 0 ) unaected. This implies that the old
equilibrium strategy (t) is still an equilibrium for [0;T), as both v`(t) and ~ (t) remain
unchanged leading to the same surplus function  (t) as before for all t 2 [0;T 0]. For small
enough  > 0, we have V 0
I  V min
I . Hence, by Lemma 11 the net present value of costs has
decreased which implies that the original policy (T;VI) cannot be optimal.
For a policy (T;VI) such that VI > V min

































for some   2 (0;1). This allows us to dene a new policy with T 0 = T   2 (1(T);T) and


















For  suciently small, V 0
I > 0 and this new policy saves more costs than a marginal policy
change with an average   2 (0;1). As in the argument above, since v`(T 0 ) stays constant
for the new policy (T 0;V 0
I), the old equilibrium strategies for [0;T 0) and (t) = 1 for [T 0;1)
form an equilibrium. Since the marginal policy change decreases costs and the allocation in
the market has improved, the policy (T;VI) cannot be optimal. This completes the proof of
the rst part of the proposition.
For optimal prices, consider a policy (T;VI) with 2(T) < T. By Proposition 8, we must
have that VI 2 (0;V min
I ). Dene a new policy by T 0 = T + and V 0
I = VIe (r+)(T T0). This
denes a marginal policy change that leaves v`(T) unchanged. Furthermore, for  suciently
small we have that  (t) > 0 for all t 2 [T;T 0), since at the original policy  (T  ) > 0. Hence,
the old equilibrium strategy  is still an equilibrium, but the new policy is cheaper. Hence,
(T;VI) cannot be optimal.
48Appendix B Free Disposal of Lemons
We derive here a sucient condition on the number of securities S that rules out incentives
for traders to dispose of assets in steady state in order to become buyers again. Notice rst
that the value of sellers is larger than the value of lemons independent of the trading strategy
 by buyers,
vs  v`. (B.1)
Hence, it is sucient to show that v`  vb which also implies that p > 0 for any  > 0. For





















































Hence, the sign of this expression depends on
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This expression is increasing in  whenever  > r and decreasing otherwise.
Assume rst that r > . Then, with  = 0, the expression above is positive as long as












Similarly, for  > r, set  = 1 and the expression is positive as long as




This implies that a sucient condition for traders not to dispose of any assets is given by
maxf;  g
1   maxf;  g
 S (B.7)
whenever   minf;  g.
When  < minf;  g, free disposal does not matter, as there is no trade in steady state and
it cannot be an optimal strategy for any trader with a lemon to dispose of his asset with
positive probability so that there is trade again, since he would then have a strictly higher
utility from retaining the lemon.
49Appendix C Pooling vs. Separating Contracts
We show here that oering a pooling contract is a dominant strategy for buyers. We as-
sume that there is positive trade surplus for good assets, but non-positive trade surplus for
lemons.26 Denote the net value of a good asset to a seller as vg




Denote the net value of a lemon to a seller as v`
s and to a buyer as v`
b  v`




Consider any contract (p;q), where p is the price paid by the buyer and q is the probability
that the seller transfers the asset. We want to show that buyers always prefer a pooling
contract or in other words do not have an incentive to separate sellers by using contracts
with lotteries (i.e. q < 1).
Case (1): Pooling contract with (p;q) to trade with both types
Sellers with good asset will sell at price p if and only if





Hence, given q, the buyer will oer the price p = qvg





b + (1   ~ )qv
`











Since the return is linear in q, we have that no lottery will be used and the solution is either
(p;q) = (0;0) or (p;q) = (vg
s;1).
Case (2): Separating contract (pg;qg) and (p`;q`)
To separate and trade with the two types, the two contracts have to satisfy incentive con-





























Since there is no trade surplus from trading lemons, any equilibrium with trade must have
some trade of the good asset or qg > 0. This implies that (C.5) is never binding or that
26We could dispense of this assumption. There could then be a separating equilibrium where only lemons
are traded, but not the good asset. We would interpret such a situation still as a market freeze.
27These net values are dened by vg
s = vs   vb, v
g
b = vo   vb, v`
s = v`   vb and v`
b = v`   vb.
50lemons will always be sold (see vg
s > v`
s). Also, both (C.3) and (C.6) must be binding,
otherwise it is protable for the buyer to lower both pg and p` by some " > 0 or p` by some



























implying that p`  pg.
















































subject to q`  qg: If v`
b < v`
s, it is thus optimal to set q` = qg implying that pg = p`. We
then have a pooling contract. To the contrary, if v`
b = v`













which gives exactly the same payo as with a pooling contract. In particular, if v
g
b + (1  
)v`
b   vg
s > 0, then qg = q` = 1 and pg = p` = vg
s. If v
g
b + (1   )v`
b   vg
s < 0, then there
exist only trades with lemons which generates zero trade surplus.
Case (3): Trade by good or bad sellers only at (pg;qg) or (p`;q`), respectively
To exclude lemons, we need p`   q`v`
s < 0, which by (C.6) implies that pg   qgv`
s < 0
contradicting (C.3). By assumption, trade of bad assets only cannot generate any positive
trade surplus for the buyers.
51Appendix D Avoiding a Self-fullling Freeze through
Guarantees
Trading on the market can also cease because of a coordination failure (see Figure 2). In such
a case, there is either partial trading or no trading in steady state. We show here for steady
state equilibria that guaranteeing a oor on the value of the asset can resurrect trading. The
reason is that such a policy makes purchasing an asset when in a meeting a strictly dominant
strategy for buyers for any steady state equilibrium. More interestingly, such a guarantee
would be costless in equilibrium. Having bought a lemon, a buyer is always worse o taking
the guarantee than waiting to trade his lemon to another trader in the functioning market.
To show this, let  > r and  2 ( ;). Then there exists a no trade and a partial trade
steady state equilibrium. Dene the guarantee oered by the MMLR by the price
PG = v`      vb(). (D.1)
In steady state, the surplus from trading for a buyer is given by




+rvs. The max operator expresses the fact that a buyer with a
lemon has the option to receive a utility transfer equal to v`    or can wait for a trade in
the market anticipating to receive an oer with probability  when he meets a buyer.
Suppose rst that  2 [0;1). Recall that the market price is given by p = vs   vb() if
 2 (0;1]. Then, since ~  decreases with , we have that
~ ()vo+(1   ~ ())maxfPG + vb();v`()g   p   vb()




  vs > 0
(D.3)
for  > 0 suciently small, since  > ~ . Since the trading surplus is strictly positive
independent of the future buyers' trading strategy, it is a strictly dominant strategy to set
 = 1. Hence, there cannot be a steady state equilibrium with  < 1. For  = 0, we have
vb() = v`() = 0. The result follows then directly, since oering p = vs yields again




 vs > 0. (D.4)
with  >   and  suciently small.
Finally, with  = 1, buyers that obtain a lemon will not take advantage of the guarantee as
they can obtain a higher value by waiting to trade in the market for any positive . Hence,
52 = 1 is the only steady state equilibrium and the guarantee is never used in equilibrium.
Notice, however, that the oor that the guarantee provides depends explicitly on how much
trading there is on the market as reected by vb(). In the unique steady state equilibrium
with trade, the guarantee gets smaller as the surplus from trading increases.
53Appendix E Avoiding Deadweight Costs when Inter-
vening
The MMLR incurs a deadweight cost when increasing the quantity of lemons bought. For
any additional quantity Q = Q   Qmin of lemons bought at price P, only the portion
(P   Pmin)Q provides an additional transfer to lemons, since the market functions again
after the intervention and a lemon has an expected market value of Pmin. The MMLR could,
however, avoid the deadweight cost by selling the additional quantity Q back to buyers
immediately after the intervention has taken place at a price just below Pmin. The market
will still function continuously after the sale, since the average quality of the asset in the
market remains above the threshold to sustain trading in equilibrium. Also, buyers would
be willing to purchase lemons at this price, as they make non-negative prots from this
transaction in expected terms. The reason is that later on they can sell the lemon again on
the market. Thus, the deadweight cost is simply shifted from the MMLR to future buyers.
When selling additional lemons lemons back to the market at price v`, the cost of the
intervention is then approximately given by28















The costs are thus given by a constant for the minimum intervention plus the net cost for
providing an option value VI > 0. In a sense, the MMLR can now recover the x cost per
additional lemon purchased, while before this was a deadweight cost providing no additional
transfer to traders. Of course, the MMLR is only able to sell lemons in the market, if it
cannot be observed who bought these asset from the MMLR in the rst place.
Finally, the cost of providing an option value VI  ^ VI have now decreased making it more
attractive to rely on the announcement eect and thus delaying the intervention. Indeed,
the cost function is now smooth at ^ VI when assuming immediate exit from any additional
purchases of lemons. Also, it does not matter for the costs anymore whether the MMLR
increases Q or P. They are now perfect substitutes in terms of the costs of providing any
particular option value VI.
28The sale would occur at T +  at price Pmin   . To ease the exposition, we neglect the innitesimally
small terms.
54Appendix F Social Costs of Intervention and Optimal
Policy
When the social costs of intervening are positive, but suciently low, it is optimal to achieve
continuously functioning markets. This implies immediately that the MMLR should inter-
vene immediately in those circumstances. Conversely, when these costs get large, it is never
optimal for the MMLR to intervene. This can be stated more formally as follows.
Proposition F.1. Suppose (0) < minf;  g. There exists a cut-o point  > 0 such that
it is optimal to intervene immediately for all  2 (0;]. Conversely, if  ! 1, it is never
optimal to intervene (T  ! 1).
We establish the rst result by a series of lemmata. We denote by V (T = 0) and c(T = 0)
the benets and costs associated with continuous trade. Note that we have shown that the
optimal policy conditional on continuous trade is given by T = 0 and a minimum intervention
PminQmin. We show next that never intervening cannot be optimal for small enough (social)
costs of intervention.
Lemma F.2. For  suciently close to 1=2, T = 1 cannot be optimal.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that T = 1 is optimal. We then have that
V (T = 1) > V (T = 0)   c(T = 0). (F.1)
Since V (T = 1) < V (T = 0), for  suciently close to 0 this inequality is violated.
We strengthen this result in two ways. First, we show that the optimal policy given  {
denoted by 	() { converges to continuous trade as the (social) costs of intervention vanish.
Then, we show that the optimal policy has the time of intervention as well as the option
value go to zero. The value associated with the optimal policy is denoted by V (	()) and
the cost by c(	()).
Lemma F.3. The optimal policy implies V (	()) ! V (T = 0) for  ! 0. Furthermore,
the optimal policy 	() satises T(	()) ! 0 and VI(	()) ! 0 for  ! 0.
55Proof. Since 	() is the optimal policy, we have that
V (T = 0)   c(T = 0) < V (	())   c(	()), (F.2)
where it must be the case that c(	()) < c(T = 0). Hence,
0 < V (T = 0)   V (	()) < [c(T = 0)   c(	())], (F.3)
and the rst result follows.
For the second result, suppose to the contrary that liminf T() = T > 0 for  ! 0. Then, it
must be the case that V (	(n)) ! V (T = 0). This implies that 2(T) ! 0. As T(n) > T,
it must be the case that
liminf c(	(n)) > c(T = 0) + c(V
min
I ) > c(T = 0). (F.4)
But this implies that for  suciently close to 0, c(T = 0) is cheaper. Hence, 	() cannot
be the optimal policy, a contradiction.
The result for VI follows from an analogous argument.
We complete the proof of the rst part of the proposition, by showing rst that the optimal
policy has no announcement eect for  close enough to 0. We can then show that subject
to having no announcement eect, it is indeed optimal to intervene immediately when  > 0,
but small.
Lemma F.4. For any sequence n ! 1=2, there exists some N such that 1 = T(	(n)) for
all n > N.
Proof. Suppose that (0) < minf;  g and let T > 0. For a minimum intervention, i.e.
VI = 0, we have that
 (0) = ~ (0)(vo   vs) + (1   ~ (0))(v`(0)   vs) < 0. (F.5)
The value of a lemon for all t < T can be at most v`(t) < 
+rvs + VI. For VI < V min
I , we
also have that
 (t) = ~ (t)(vo   vs) + (1   ~ (t))(v`(t)   vs) < 0, (F.6)
for all t in some interval [0;T ) where T > 0.
56Given ~ (0), we can then choose N large enough such that T and VI are suciently close to
0 and satisfy
 (T
 ) < ~ (T








Then,  (t) < 0 for all [0;T). Hence, there is no trade before the intervention for any
candidate policy that is better than T = 0 and where  is suciently close to 1=2.
Lemma F.5. Consider any policy such that there is no trading before the intervention (1 =
T). There exists an interval [0;] with  > 0 such that it is optimal to intervene immediately.
Proof. Without trading before the intervention, it is never optimal to increase the price or
the quantity of the intervention. For this case, it is also possible to calculate explicitly the

































Total welfare is then given by
W() = w0   e
 rTPminQmin. (F.9)































C = PminQmin. (F.13)
The sign of
@W()
@T is equal to the sign of
 

r(A   C)   (r + )Be
 T
. (F.14)
The last term is largest for the lowest feasible T. Since rA > (r + )B, there exists  such
that the expression above is exactly 0 at this T. Hence, for any 0   < ,
@W()
@T < 0 for all
feasible T which completes the proof.
57Finally, we prove the second part of the proposition which is restated here as a separate
lemma for the convenience of the reader.
Lemma F.6. If  ! 1, it is never optimal to intervene (T  ! 1).
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that limsup!1 T =  T < 1. This implies that
c(	)  PminQmine
 r  T > 0. (F.15)
We have that the benets of any policy are bounded by V (T = 0). Hence, for any optimal
policy we have that
V (T = 0)   V (T = 1)  V (	())   V (T = 1)  c(	())  PminQmine
 r  T. (F.16)
Letting  ! 1 violates this inequality.
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